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
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UNITED STATES INTELLIGENCE BOARD
COUNTERMEASURES RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT SUBCOMMITTEE
THREAT ASSESSMENT TASK FORCE

11 September 1974

ATTENDEES:

25X1A



1. Third Meeting

The third meeting of the Threat Assessment Task Force was held on 11 September 1974 at 0930 hours at the Ames Building.

2. Presentation

The "Planning Study" work sponsored by the CIA and the Department of State at [] was presented by [] project personnel.

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3. Discussion

a. The mission of the Threat Assessment Task Force was discussed.

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SENSITIVE INTELLIGENCE SOURCES
AND METHODS INVOLVED

b. Possible products and recommendations were discussed.

4. Agenda for Next Meeting

Since the Final Report of the Task Force is due at the October R&D Subcommittee meeting, the Task Force must shortly prepare its recommendations. All members are therefore requested to be prepared to present and discuss recommendations, products, etc., for inclusion in the Final Report at the next meeting. Short, written descriptions of each product, etc., would be helpful.

5. Next Meeting

The next meeting will be on 2 October at 0930 hours at the [] Facility.

6. Adjournment

The meeting was adjourned at 1200 hours.

[]
Secretary

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
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UNITED STATES INTELLIGENCE BOARD
COUNTERMEASURES RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT SUBCOMMITTEE
THREAT ASSESSMENT TASK FORCE

28 August 1974

ATTENDEES:

25X1A



1. Second Meeting

The second meeting of the Threat Assessment Task Force was held on 28 August 1974 at 0930 hours at the [] Facility.

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2. Discussion

For the benefit of those attending the second meeting who were not present at the initial meeting, the mission, direction, and end products previously identified were summarized.

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This summary resulted in substantial discussion of the scope, charter, mission, and end products of the Threat Task Force by attendees at the second meeting who were absent at the initial meeting. In general, this discussion raised serious questions as to the practicality, purpose, and means by which the end products were to be achieved. The two basic viewpoints were not satisfactorily resolved during this discussion.

The discussion was then turned to methodologies by which substantial elements of the previously identified end products could be accomplished.

a. The ☐ estimating methods for transmitter power were discussed.

b. The applicability of existing ☐ systems models to ACM effectiveness were discussed. ☐ representatives will be available 11 September 1974 in Room 607, Ames, for further explanations of this effort. 25X1A 25X1A

c. The possibility of a cross-reference index to categorize threat scenarios and sites on a worldwide basis.

d. The elements and methods of threat analysis and technological forecasting were discussed with the OSI attendees with regard to information they could provide for validation and forecasting. The consensus was that they could provide information if the questions were sufficiently specific.

e. The OSI attendees additionally stated that they could probably identify Soviet purchases of U.S. surveillance and countermeasures systems if they were provided with sufficient information to identify these items.

The close of discussion was ambivalent with one member stating that the meeting had accomplished nothing and questioning the feasibility of the end products identified. Others in attendance felt that all the end products were feasible at least in part and that resources existed to accomplish them.

3. Agenda for Next Meeting

No topic for the next meeting was discussed.

4. Next Meeting

The next meeting will be on 11 September 1974
at 0915 hours in Room 607 of the Ames Center Building
(1820 North Fort Myer Drive, Rosslyn, VA).

5. Adjournment

The meeting adjourned at 1215 hours.



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
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UNITED STATES INTELLIGENCE BOARD
COUNTERMEASURES RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT SUBCOMMITTEE
THREAT ASSESSMENT TASK FORCE

1 August 1974

ATTENDEES:

25X1A



Navy
FBI
CIA
CIA
CIA
CIA

1. Initial Meeting

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The initial meeting of the Threat Assessment Task Force was held on 1 August 1974 at 0930 hours at the [] Facility.

2. Discussion

The general problem of threat assessment was discussed including:

- a. problem definition,
- b. alternate approaches and methodologies, and
- c. future frequency of such effort.

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A preliminary draft of a task force mission, objectives, and criteria statement was produced and is attached. Some factors that affect the technical threat were also identified and are attached.

3. Agenda for Next Meeting

The topic for the next meeting is to further discuss the output or kinds of output that should result from the Threat Assessment Task Force and to define them in the greatest amount of detail possible.

4. Next Meeting

The next meeting of the Threat Assessment Task Force will be Wednesday, 28 August 1974 at 0930 hours at the [] Facility.

5. Adjournment

The meeting adjourned at 1130 hours.

[]
Secretary

Attachments:
as stated

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THREAT ASSESSMENT TASK FORCE

MISSION

Technically and operationally evaluate foreign audio and video surveillance capabilities believed to be employed or capable of employment against U.S. installations or personnel for the purpose of enhancing the United States Government's technical surveillance countermeasures posture.

CRITERIA

1. The threat assessments must provide practical threat estimates (i.e., within reasonable technical and operational constraints) as distinguished from the earlier "DC to Light" approach.
2. The threat assessments must consider environmental/operational factors that affect the threat.
3. Output must be usable.

OBJECTIVES

1. The objective of the Threat Assessment Task Force is to produce end products that will:
 - a. impact on day-to-day audio countermeasures (ACM) operations,
 - b. impact on training provided to ACM personnel,
 - c. impact on long-range programming of both a procurement and R&D nature, and
 - d. provide threat inputs suitable for systems analysis programs or efforts.

POSSIBLE END PRODUCTS

1. Positive audio surveillance scenarios.

2. A world-wide hostile audio surveillance threat assessment.

3. Evaluation of the effectiveness of current ACM operations based on the threat estimate.

4. Technological forecast for guidance to R&D equipment procurement activities.

SOME FACTORS AFFECTING THE ACM THREAT

Proximity/Range

Common Wall

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[Redacted]

Access

Unlimited
Limited
No Access

Operational Freedom

[Redacted]

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Kind of Access Agent

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[Redacted]

Environment

[Redacted]

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Availability of Hardware/Techniques

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[Redacted]